Neopragmatism is a very general language-first approach to questions about the existence or nature of various traditionally philosophically troubling entities or properties. It rejects metaphysical questions about these things by instead focusing our attention on our practices of using the relevant words: words like 'true', 'four', 'immoral', 'necessary', 'art', and so on. Once we have unmysterious naturalistic explanations of our practices of making assertions with these sorts of words, and of assessing those assertions as true or false, metaphysical worries about them should simply fade away.

Neopragmatism differs from more common expressivist accounts of the same sorts of vocabulary because expressivism is almost always offered as a local view, presented against a more general representationalist background. Neopragmatists, on the other hand, defend a global view that endorses deflationary accounts of the whole constellation of representational and semantic notions such as reference, truth, belief, assertion, and proposition. A general deflationism of this sort makes it impossible to draw a contrast between representational and non-representational propositions, assertions, or beliefs. While neopragmatism has been on the scene since the 1980's, it has generally only been visible to theorists working on the very general issue of the relation of language to reality. When it comes to first-order philosophical issues such as the nature of time, or the various modals, or color, or art, neopragmatism often seems simply not to be on the radar. This volume takes up the task of exploring the implications - direct and indirect - of the neopragmatist perspective for various first order philosophical issues.